数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

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数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

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内容简介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

内页插图

目录

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下载 epub mobi pdf txt 电子书 2025

评分☆☆☆☆☆

拉丰教授认为激励问题是经济学的核心问题,因而几十年来,他一直献身于激励理论的研究与应用,而三卷本的巨著《激励理论》（与马赫蒂摩合著,第一卷已于2002年出版）是集这一理论40年发展之大成之作,9标志着激励理论的一个统一的标准的理论框架的形成,9被经济学大师肯尼思·阿罗誉为激励理论发展的一个里程碑.

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建立基础

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指人对实现该目标有多大价值的主观判断。如果实现该目标对人来说，很有价值，人的积极性就高；反之，积极性则低。

评分☆☆☆☆☆

拉丰教授是一个极其勤奋，因而高产的学者,迄今为止已经出版了12本专著和300多篇高水平的学术论文.他的学术贡献为他在经济学界赢得了极高的声誉.同时,作为一个著名的经济学教育家,他为法国经济学的振兴作出了巨大的贡献.

评分☆☆☆☆☆

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非常满意，五星

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早期的激励理论研究是对于“需要”的研究，回答了以什么为基础、或根据什么才能激发调动起员工工作积极性的问题，包括马斯洛的需求层次理论、赫茨伯格的双因素理论，和麦克利兰的成就需要理论等。最具代表性的马斯洛需要层次论就提出人类的需要是有等级层次的，从最低级的需要逐级向最高级的需要发展。需要按其重要性依次排列为：生理需要、安全需要、归属与爱的需要、尊重需要和自我实现需要。并且提出当某一级的需要获得满足以后，这种需要便中止了它的激励作用。

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