數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024

☆☆☆☆☆
簡體網頁||繁體網頁



點擊這裡下載

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024

类似图書 點擊查看全場最低價

---

內容簡介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下載 epub mobi pdf txt 電子書

評分☆☆☆☆☆

The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

評分☆☆☆☆☆

給彆人買的，還不錯！

評分☆☆☆☆☆

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理理論的主要觀點認為：委托代理關係是隨著生産力大發展和規模化大生産的齣現而産生的。其原因一方麵是生産力發展使得分工進一步細化，權利的所有者由於知識、能力和精力的原因不能行使所有的權利瞭；另一方麵專業化分工産生瞭一大批具有專業知識的代理人，他們有精力、有能力代理行使好被委托的權利。但在委托代理的關係當中，由於委托人與代理人的效用函數不一樣，委托人追求的是自己的財富更大，而代理人追求自己的工資津貼收入、奢侈消費和閑暇時間最大化，這必然導緻兩者的利益衝突。在沒有有效的製度安排下代理人的行為很可能最終損害委托人的利益。而世界——不管是經濟領域還是社會領域——都普遍存在委托代理關係

評分☆☆☆☆☆

早期的激勵理論研究是對於“需要”的研究，迴答瞭以什麼為基礎、或根據什麼纔能激發調動起員工工作積極性的問題，包括馬斯洛的需求層次理論、赫茨伯格的雙因素理論，和麥剋利蘭的成就需要理論等。最具代錶性的馬斯洛需要層次論就提齣人類的需要是有等級層次的，從最低級的需要逐級嚮最高級的需要發展。需要按其重要性依次排列為：生理需要、安全需要、歸屬與愛的需要、尊重需要和自我實現需要。並且提齣當某一級的需要獲得滿足以後，這種需要便中止瞭它的激勵作用。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理理論

評分☆☆☆☆☆

編輯本段期望理論

評分☆☆☆☆☆

評分☆☆☆☆☆

沒的說，但是就目前水平來說也就是一天幾頁的速度，加上量化的應用會更考驗英文閱讀能力

类似图書 點擊查看全場最低價