數學與金融經典教材(影印版)·激勵理論:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model]

數學與金融經典教材(影印版)·激勵理論:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2025

[美] 拉奉特(Laffont J.J.) 著
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齣版社: 世界圖書齣版公司
ISBN:9787510050503
版次:1
商品編碼:11154485
包裝:平裝
外文名稱:The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model
開本:16開
齣版時間:2013-01-01
用紙:膠版紙
頁數:421
正文語種:英文

具體描述

內容簡介

  The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

  The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead, our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
  The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
  Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
  ……

用戶評價

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好!

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《激勵理論:委托代理模型》是著名微觀理論經濟學傢拉奉特以及其學生martimort的閤寫的理論著作,其影響力可想而知。經濟學和激勵的關係密切,如激勵努力工作、激勵高質量産品、激勵努力學習、激勵投資和激勵儲蓄。盡管adam smith兩百多年前在他的佃農閤同分析中充分肯定瞭這一點,但隻有在近些年這個理論在經濟思想中纔占據瞭核心地位。本書中,jean-jacques laffont 和david martimort對激勵理論的錶述是目前最透徹的和最容易學習的。本理論的核心是對現代管理就如同對經濟理論一樣至關重要的簡單問題:是什麼讓人們在一個經濟和商業環境中會有特殊的錶現?為瞭尋找答案,書中給齣瞭特定的環境下能夠確保對經濟機構的良好激勵的方法論工具。

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期望值

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好書,原版的。。好好看

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都是英文,看不懂啊

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指人對實現該目標可能性大小的主觀估計。隻有人認為實現該目標的可能性很大,纔會去努力爭取實現,從而在較高程度上發揮目標的激勵作用;如果人認為實現該目標的可能性很小,甚至完全沒有可能,目標激勵作用則小,以至完全沒有。

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委托代理理論的主要觀點認為:委托代理關係是隨著生産力大發展和規模化大生産的齣現而産生的。其原因一方麵是生産力發展使得分工進一步細化,權利的所有者由於知識、能力和精力的原因不能行使所有的權利瞭;另一方麵專業化分工産生瞭一大批具有專業知識的代理人,他們有精力、有能力代理行使好被委托的權利。但在委托代理的關係當中,由於委托人與代理人的效用函數不一樣,委托人追求的是自己的財富更大,而代理人追求自己的工資津貼收入、奢侈消費和閑暇時間最大化,這必然導緻兩者的利益衝突。在沒有有效的製度安排下代理人的行為很可能最終損害委托人的利益。而世界——不管是經濟領域還是社會領域——都普遍存在委托代理關係

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書寫的不錯,內容很全麵

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