數學與金融經典教材(影印版)·激勵理論:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model]

數學與金融經典教材(影印版)·激勵理論:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2025

[美] 拉奉特(Laffont J.J.) 著
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齣版社: 世界圖書齣版公司
ISBN:9787510050503
版次:1
商品編碼:11154485
包裝:平裝
外文名稱:The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model
開本:16開
齣版時間:2013-01-01
用紙:膠版紙
頁數:421
正文語種:英文

具體描述

內容簡介

  The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

  The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead, our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
  The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
  Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
  ……

用戶評價

評分

委托代理理論是製度經濟學契約理論的主要內容之一,主要研究的委托代理關係是指一個或多個行為主體根據一種明示或隱含的契約,指定、雇傭另一些行為主體為其服務,同時授予後者一定的決策權利,並根據後者提供的服務數量和質量對其支付相應的報酬。授權者就是委托人,被授權者就是代理人。

評分

委托代理(agency by agreement),是指代理人的代理權根據被代理人的委托授權行為而産生。因委托代理中,被代理人是以意思錶示的方法將代理權授予代理人的,故又稱 “意定代理” 或 “任意代理”。

評分

77411255563384669855

評分

委托代理理論是建立在非對稱信息博弈論的基礎上的。非對稱信息(asymmetric information)指的是某些參與人擁有但另一些參與人不擁有的信息。信息的非對稱性可從以下兩個角度進行劃分:一是非對稱發生的時間,二是非對稱信息的內容。從非對稱發生的時間看,非對稱性可能發生在當事人簽約之前(ex ante),也可能發生在簽約之後(ex post),分彆稱為事前非對稱和事後非對稱。研究事前非對稱信息博弈的模型稱為逆嚮選擇模型(adverse selection),研究事後非對稱信息的模型稱為道德風險模型(moral hazard)。從非對稱信息的內容看,非對稱信息可能是指某些參與人的行為(action),研究此類問題的,我們稱為隱藏行為模型(hidden action);也可能是指某些參與人隱藏的知識(knowledge),研究此類問題的模型我們稱之為隱藏知識模型(hidden knowledge)。

評分

管理心理學把激勵看成是“持續激發動機的心理過程”。激勵水平越高,完成目標的努力程度和滿意度也越強,工作效能就越高;反之,激勵水平越低,則缺乏完成組織目標的動機,工作效率也越低[2]。

評分

編輯本段定義

評分

評分

評分

早期的激勵理論研究是對於“需要”的研究,迴答瞭以什麼為基礎、或根據什麼纔能激發調動起員工工作積極性的問題,包括馬斯洛的需求層次理論、赫茨伯格的雙因素理論,和麥剋利蘭的成就需要理論等。最具代錶性的馬斯洛需要層次論就提齣人類的需要是有等級層次的,從最低級的需要逐級嚮最高級的需要發展。需要按其重要性依次排列為:生理需要、安全需要、歸屬與愛的需要、尊重需要和自我實現需要。並且提齣當某一級的需要獲得滿足以後,這種需要便中止瞭它的激勵作用。

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